Abstract: China's relatively recent dramatic increase in forest area has been hailed domestically and globally as one of the world's few environmental success stories, but significant problems remain in China's reforestation efforts. We describe the challenges that China still faces if it is to meet its laudable -but sometimes contradictory -goals for its forest sector: improving rural livelihoods, sustaining and restoring ecosystem services, and increasing output of the forestproduct-dependent manufacturing and construction sectors. We do so while pointing out the unintended consequences of implementing these policy goals: overstatement of the quantity and quality of the forest recovery, domestic human and ecological costs of the reforestation, and externalization of China's continually growing demand for timber and forest products in the form of increased imports from vulnerable forests in other parts of the world.
Introduction
In 2011, the State Forestry Administration (SFA) reported that at the end of 2009, 20.36 percent of China's land area was forested, up from an estimated 5-8 percent in 1950, and that another 4 percent would be forested by 2020.
1 This increase in forest area has been hailed domestically and globally as one of the world's few environmental success stories, 2 in contrast to both deforestation in other countries and China's own dismal record on many other environmental issues. There is no doubt that more of China is now forested than in 1950 or 1990 , and that the massive process of deforestation that characterized much of recent Chinese history from the Qing through the Cultural Revolution has now been halted or reversed. But significant problems remain. While not wishing to deny the indubitable progress of China's reforestation efforts, in this article we describe the challenges that China still faces if it is to meet its laudable -but sometimes contradictory -goals for its forest sector: improving rural livelihoods, sustaining and restoring ecosystem services, and increasing output of the forest-product-dependent manufacturing and construction sectors. We do so while pointing out the unintended consequences of implementing these policy goals: overstatement of the quantity and quality of the forest recovery, domestic human and ecological costs of the reforestation, and externalization of China's continually growing demand for timber and forest products in the form of increased imports from vulnerable forests in Russia, Southeast Asia, and Africa.
Roots of the crisis: forestry in the Maoist period
When the PRC was founded, China had already experienced centuries of deforestation, which accelerated in the Qing and Republic; one estimate places forest cover at 26% in 1700 and only 9% in 1937. 3 But policies in the Maoist period did little to address this lack of forests. Forestry between 1949 and 1978 was marked by rapid resource exploitation and depletion, with little concern for regeneration or active management. Between 1953 and 1958 , all forestland was removed from private ownership and placed into either state-owned or collective forests. 4 Most wood production for construction, mining, and transport came from state-managed forest farms, while collective forests supplied fuelwood and construction needs for local communities.
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Investment in regeneration was low.
Still, during the 1950s, the government recognized that China's forests were historically depleted and inadequate, and called for the afforestation of nearly 100 million hectares (mmha) (approximately ten percent of China's total land area), focusing on creating protected areas and planting fast-growing species of high economic value. 6 However, these early efforts at afforestation are now generally regarded as having been ineffectual, with high rates of mortality, due to a lack of technical expertise, poor selection of sites and species, and an inadequate definition of responsibility that led to neglect in the maintenance and protection of young forests.
7
If the afforestation programs of the initial years of the PRC were ineffective, the policies of the Great Leap Forward period were disastrous for forests. It is estimated that between 20 and 30 mmha were deforested between 1958 and 1962, constituting the loss of about a quarter of China's forested areas. 8 Modest recovery after 1962 still left China's forested area at a historic minimum (see Table 1 ). Ross 1980. 6 Food and Agricultural Organization 1982. 7 Food and Agricultural Organization 1982. 8 He et al. 2008. 9 Data before the 1970s are unreliable and controversial. See He et al. 2008; Démurger and Yang 2007; Dikötter 2010; Dai et al. 2011; He et al. 2011 . The large increase in forest coverage between the fourth and fifth inventories (1989-93 to 1994-97) partly reflects a change in the definition of forested area from minimum 30% to 20% canopy cover. 34 These all reflect the trend on the part of the state to try to balance the goals of economic growth and environmental protection. However, China's environmental record has been decidedly mixed. The forest sector, though doing somewhat better than, for example, water resources or air quality, has also had a mixed record, demonstrating the diverse and perhaps contradictory goals now adopted for forestry: improving rural livelihoods, protecting and enhancing ecosystem services, and growing the forest-sector economy.
These diverse goals may conflict at some levels, but they all depend on the quantitative and qualitative recovery of forests. Realizing this, the government in 1998 made a radical change in its investment strategies in the forestry sector. As figure 1 shows, the investment strategy of the 1950s through the 1970s reflected the general goals of economic development and national construction, in which forest resources were used for short-term gains without much thought to long-term sustainability; investment favored industry over silviculture 35 33 Cann et al. 2005, 3-34; Li 2005; Tilt 2010 . 34 Chinafaqs.org. 2011. 35 Silvicultural practices vary globally, but here we mean a potential combination of planting, thinning and harvesting activities. Silviculture can be distinguished from purely afforestation programs, which may include no planned thinning or harvesting activities. and afforestation by a ratio of 2:1. After the 1998 shock, expenditures shifted dramatically to afforestation and silviculture, and expenditures in this sector came to dominate industry by 9:1. China 's Forest Stocks, 1998 . The Seventh NFI (2004 reported a 12 percent overall increase in forest coverage over the previous inventory (Table 2) . successful in overall quantitative terms, the quality of the forests and the ecosystem services they provide is often questionable. There are very few close-to-mature forests remaining, and youngand middle-aged forests have lower density and productivity than older forests. 39 This is, of course, an inevitable result of previous deforestation; one cannot plant mature forests, and newly-planted forests will have less biomass than those they replaced.
Shelter Forests. Probably the best known shelterbelt is the Three North Protective Forest project (sanbei baohulin gongcheng , colloquially called the Great Green Wall (lüse wanli changcheng , which was initiated in 1978 and is planned to be 38 Forestland is now defined as land with at least 20% canopy cover. Fruit trees and cash orchards began to be included in the mid-1980s, followed by a reduction in canopy cover requirements, and later by the inclusion of shrubs. 39 Yin 1998. completed by 2050. Intended to combat desertification and soil loss, as well as reduce the impact of dust storms that plague north China, it covers parts of 13 provincial level units and 551 county-level units in the northeast, north, and northwest, and is scheduled to reforest over 30 mmha, or about three percent of China's total land area. 40 In addition, the Taihang Mountain Afforestation Project (taihangshan fulin gongcheng has also covered more than 20 mmha in a specific effort to reduce sandstorms. However, desertification has continued to advance in the northern regions despite the afforestation programs, leading to questions about the structure, quality and diversity of the trees planted in such programs. Survival rates of GGW plantations have been estimated to be as low as 15 percent. Some scholars have raised the possibility that poorly planned afforestation efforts, including planting any trees at all in areas that have long been grasslands or shrublands, have led to negative balances in soil moisture, thus potentially exacerbating the very desertification problems that such policies were intended to combat. 41 The very partial success of these programs seems to reflect a general tendency in China to solve ecological problems through large-scale, uniform megaprojects often poorly adapted to local conditions. Challenges. China has doubtless made serious efforts to reverse the centuries-long trend of deforestation and to mitigate the ecological effects of more recent development policies. In many ways, China has turned the corner; more of the country is forested than at any time since the early Qing. But the general tendency to implement reforestation and forest protection in a top-down manner, often without due consideration of the suitability of particular programs and particular species in specific places, has meant that much of the noble effort at reforestation has been unsuccessful, and much of the funding for such programs has been wasted. Even in areas where programs have shown success, forests will not grow back immediately; the ultimate success of the reforestation effort will demand both improved methods and patience. In the meantime, as we show below, China will need to depend on foreign imports to feed much of its forest-products industry, putting stress on forests in countries that may not yet have the capacity to manage their forests with even the care and expertise shown in China. 76 In general though, these programs are not creating short-or long-term economic opportunities and have a fixed period within which they will continue to provide payments.
National-Scale Reforestation

Rural livelihoods and the challenges of poverty and environmental justice
Ongoing challenges. The relationship between tenure reform, rural incomes, and forest ecological health is not a simple one, and the regime has not always dealt with this complexity in an ideal manner. Most obviously, implementation of reforms has not always provided secure tenure; rights have been granted, revoked, and changed too often, despite the fact that success depends on tenure certainty and limited market distortions. This is perhaps the inevitable result of "crossing the river by feeling the stones," but it has led in some cases to overexploitation of timber resources in the short run, without replanting, and thus to decline in forest cover and quality. 77 Programs that provide payments for environmental services, such as the RFFP, have been widely celebrated as successful in stabilizing incentives and thus promoting forest conservation and improving rural livelihoods; however, many of these programs are subsidized by the central government, and will not continue indefinitely. Both the NFPP and the RFFP also suffer from a top-down approach that leaves little apparent room for flexibility in local choices.
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State directives control even the species permitted to be planted and areas required to enroll, regardless of the ecological suitability. 79 The top-down approach to the NFPP has left many 74 Bennett 2008 . 75 Xu and Melick 2007. 76 Xu et al. 2006 . 77 Yin and Newman 1997. 78 Xu et al. 2006; Bennett 2008; Trac et al. 2007; Urgenson et al. 2010 . 79 Uchida et al. 2005; Uchida et al. 2007. landowners feeling a lack of decision-making autonomy, and the durability of the program's conservation effects is questionable: landowners may be inclined to start farming their lands again after the subsidies end. There is evidence that agroforestry practices, and intercropping in particular, may contribute significantly to overall agricultural productivity while simultaneously providing environmental services. 80 Ensuring that landowners have the right to individually determine and engage in mixed practices might enable win-win situations where livelihoods and the environment are improved.
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There is also an assumption that privatization is universally superior to communal management in promoting long-term care of forests, because it will "liberate the productive forces of the farm household." 82 The 2008 forest tenure reforms were implemented on the basis of this assumption, and indeed there is evidence that privatization, when carried out in such a way that it provides stable tenure, provides incentives for sustainable management. At the same time, examples of privatization of grassland and forest resources in other parts of China have shown that privatizing certain areas and letting others remain under collective management can promote severely unequal access to resources and consequent overuse of the collective areas.
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As long as there are communities that depend on forest resources for subsistence, policies will need to take account of equity of access and methods of managing common-pool resources, rather than simply embracing private rights as a panacea. Hyde et al. 1996 . 82 CCP Central Committee 2008, section 1, paragraph 1. 83 Williams 1996; Harris 2009 . 84 The experience of pulp and paper manufacturer Stora Enso, which was reportedly sold use rights transferred by Hepu County officials and intermediaries in Guangxi Province without obtaining the required consent of households (Li and Nielsen 2010) , further demonstrates how households continue to be deprived of their property rights even after privatization rights were affirmed through the 2008 law.
Without improved access to economic opportunities and tenure security, conservation policies could impede, not improve, rural livelihoods in forest-dependent communities. In addition, it is quite possible that without the right property institutions, even the ecological goals of these programs will be impossible to achieve. Authorities may soon find themselves at a crossroads, having to decide between the goals of ecological sustainability and increased cash income for rural households.
Development of the forest products sector and the challenges of sustainable production
Expansion of production. In addition to ecosystem services and rural livelihoods, China's forests are also managed as a source of income and raw materials for construction and manufacturing industries. Domestic production of logs is controlled by quotas set by the central government, intended to limit harvest to volumes at or below annual incremental growth, and logs are consumed or processed domestically. While the government has a stated goal of increasing domestic production, and has in fact increased the timber quota over the last two five-year planning cycles, actual annual growth in log production in recent years has been inconsistent. However, these official statistics ignore above-quota production, which may be close to double the reported production volume: the SFA estimated that above-quota log production had averaged 75.5 mmm 3 per year from 1998-2003. 85 Given the more than 19 percent annual growth rate in sawnwood and panel production in China in the last decade, it seems improbable that total log consumption did not also grow apace. Our own assessment, based on China's officially reported wood product production, is that log consumption is, at minimum, 30% higher than officially reported.
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Semi-finished and finished goods are much less likely to be underreported than are timber resources. While China's log production has recently grown somewhat, its production of semi-finished (e.g., sawnwood, panels, etc.) and finished (e.g. furniture) wood products has grown rapidly during the same period. This growth has been fueled primarily by demand from 85 Démurger et al. 2009 . 86 Robbins 2011, pp. 116-130 . wood product markets (including those abroad) and the domestic construction sector. The raw materials needed to feed this growing demand have increasingly been supplied by imports from other countries.
Ongoing challenges. It is widely recognized that the domestic resource base is extremely constrained and will be for the foreseeable future. Natural forests, although recovering, were previously drawn down, and the 12th Five-Year Plan calls for reduced harvests from these forests. Plantations will increasingly provide the harvestable resources needed to meet harvest quotas. The annual allowable cut, quotas, permits, high taxes, and other restrictions have been used to constrain supply. However, demand has grown dramatically in recent years, and while it is currently closely linked to the export industry, it is likely to become increasingly linked to domestic demand, particularly as China's middle class expands and housing resources become more available. Grossly underestimating the volume of wood needed to maintain -let alone increase -production will create incentives for continued misreporting of resource use and will inhibit the ability to improve product quality. An increasing reliance on imports to fuel its export-oriented wood products industry (discussed below) has meant that many of these timber products come from countries with lower costs and poorly enforced environmental standards.
International repercussions and the challenges of (literally) externalizing costs
Although domestic production of logs has increased modestly, China is increasingly reliant on roundwood imports to fuel the growth of semi-finished and finished wood products. According The consumption of these materials fuels the production of both China's manufactured exports and goods consumed domestically. The growth in consumption has led China to become the world's largest importer of tropical logs, and to account for nearly a third of global imports of coniferous and about a tenth of non-coniferous, non-tropical logs (table 4) . growth in wood product production. 90 This indicates a strong commitment by the government to affirm China's role as an exporter and will likely require continued high levels of imports. There is widespread concern that, at current prices, China's continued high level of log imports will result in the drawdown of forest resources in countries that have less-stringent or poorly implemented environmental policies, and that may be eager to develop their natural resourcebased industries. Lacey Act Amendment provide policy frameworks intended to prevent the import of illegally harvested wood and wood products into the EU and the US. As an intermediary between material-source and product-destination countries, Chinese importers and manufacturers are learning how to navigate these rules. Non-policy mechanisms, such as product and chain-ofcustody certification, are also being implemented to control the supply chain of illegal and unsustainable wood products. However, although the number of chain-of-custody certificates has grown in recent years, few enterprises actually use any certified wood in their production.
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Ongoing challenges. China is now the world's largest producer and exporter of forest products. 93 The government's stated goal of continuing to expand its forest products industries while conserving its own domestic resource base will mean that questions of legality and sustainability will not disappear anytime soon. If China's domestic log production continues to 90 State Forestry Administration 2009. 91 Zhu et al. 2004, 30-47. 92 Lawson and MacFaul 2010. 93 State Forestry Administration 2009. be assigned by quota, then it will continue to rely on imports to fuel its growth in wood product production and it will face increasingly high prices for timber imports. This would be particularly true for tropical logs, where the number of exporting countries is fairly limited.
There may be new opportunities for trade between China and regions from which it does not currently import significant quantities, such as Brazil, but there are a limited number of sources of tropical wood and many of these countries are actively trying to limit deforestation. China is a major driver of demand for the trade in tropical and coniferous logs. Without a significant increase in domestic production of both coniferous and non-coniferous logs, it will continue to be reliant on imports to fuel its growth in product production. In the coniferous sector, Russia, North America and New Zealand are likely to be the most important sources of increased imports. In the non-coniferous sector, there is greater concern about where China will draw its imports from. Even if it is able to increase non-coniferous log production, it will be unable to produce large volumes of tropical logs. Although it currently serves largely as an intermediary between resource-rich developing countries that supply its raw wood resources and income-rich consuming countries to which it exports wood products, China will be expected to play an increasing role in ensuring the use of well-managed and legally harvested timber materials, not just at home but abroad as well.
Conclusion
There is no doubt that China has made enormous strides in its efforts to improve rural livelihoods, protect its forest ecology and grow its forest-based industries. Yet the results are, in many ways, mixed, and the efforts have undoubtedly had negative, yet often overlooked, unintended consequences. The problems for state-controlled forests are in a sense more straightforward; they primarily involve balancing the imperatives of enterprise profitability and domestic timber demand with those of forest ecological health. The situation in collectivelyowned forests, whether they are managed as commons or by individual leasing mechanisms, is more complex. Forest-dependent communities continue to be among China's poorest, and their economic development continues to lag far behind the coastal and urban regions. The state has pushed land tenure reform to try to provide income at the same time that it ensures reforestation and high-quality forests, and these two aims have not always been compatible.
When we examine recent forest history at a national scale, we see a generally bright picture: forest coverage has increased, which is a good thing. But gains may be overstated even at the national scale unless the ongoing problems of illegal logging and forest quality within
China are acknowledged and addressed. And at more local scales, many of the policies directed at increasing forest coverage have dubious long-term sustainable benefits for rural households and questionable ecological outcomes. The forest industry has expanded rapidly in the last fifteen years or so, but it has become reliant on imports, often from countries with highly suspicious flows and poor environmental records of their own. The government has clearly stated its intent to expand, not limit, the forest-processing industry. If resources abroad become more expensive, there will likely be a push to open up designated conservation areas to greater timber production domestically.
The triple goals of ecological sustainability, rural livelihoods, and increased production are all laudable ones; it remains to be seen how well China can balance them against one another.
As a major producer, consumer, importer, and exporter of wood and wood products, China is now expected to participate and demonstrate leadership in industry development and efficient resource use and trade, as well as in forest resource conservation and sustainable use.
